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PPROPRIATIONS bills for the United States Atomic Energy Corn-
mission usually bring forth strong protests from members of the Joint
Committee on Atomic Energy, predicting severe curtailment of the
AEC program if the Appropriations Committees’ bills are enacted as
drafted-’ But the Joint Committee’s proposed rectifying amendments are
rarely accepted, and each Appropriations Committee in House and Senate .
usually is successful in having these bills passed in the form in which they
come from committee. Without further investigation one could easily con-
clude that the Appropriations Committees are exerting a high degree of
appropriations control over the Atomic Energy Commission in the process
of appropriating funds. To discover whether this easy assumption is or is
not true is the objective of this study.
By appropriations control is meant the influence Congress exerts
through its &dquo;power of the purse&dquo;: the exclusive power to appropriate funds
for the functioning of the federal government. In exercising appropriations
control the Congress works chiefly through its agents, the Appropriations
Committee in the House of Representatives and its counterpart in the
Senate. The degree of control which these two committees can exercise
over administrative agencies is gauged chiefly in two ways. First, how much
do these committees reduce the money total budgeted for an administrative
agency? Under the federal government’s system of lump-sum appropria-
tions this is curtailment of the roughest kind. Second, what appropriation
language limitations do the committees place on the use of personal services
and other objects of expenditure and on the procedures and practices of an
administrative agency? This type of control is more specific and is directed
at an administrative facet of the program.
Appropriations control is also exercised by means of &dquo;suggestions&dquo; or
&dquo;warnings&dquo; made in committee reports or in oral exchanges at the hearings.
If these are not followed, legal and more stringent restrictions are likely
to be inserted in the appropriations bill the next year, or a committee in-
* data for this study were gathered in the course of group research supported by the
Michigan-Memorial Phoenix Project at the University of Michigan. The Phoenix
Project is devoted to research in the peacetime applications of atomic energy.
1 For an analysis of the role of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy in the atomic
energy program, see Morgan Thomas, Atomic Energy and Congress (Ann Arbor:
University of Michigan Press, 1956).
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vestigation is likely to arouse disapproval of agency actions by the general
public or an influential group. But these informal power relationships be-
tween the Appropriations Committees and administrative agencies are in
most cases too subtle for systematic study. And in this particular case, as
will be seen, the AEC’s high degree of independence renders appropria-
tions control by these informal means decidedly ineffectual. Therefore this
analysis of appropriations control over the atomic energy program will use
as general gauges only the two definite controls through curtailment of
total dollars appropriated and through administrative and procedural re-
strictions.
CURTAILMENT OF TOTAL DOLLARS APPROPRIATED
For the sake of simplicity it is possible to consolidate the three different
forms of budget authorizations which Congress has enacted for the AEC
(appropriations of new obligational authority, contract authorizations, and
appropriations of cash to liquidate prior year contract authority), because
the percentage of reductions made by the Congress in the AEC total
budget authorizations is almost the same as that made in new obligational
authority2 and as that made in cash appropriations.3 Furthermore, no obli-
gational authority has ever been lost by the Atomic Energy Commission,
because Congress at the end of each fiscal year has always reappropriated
unobligated appropriations and reauthorized unobligated contract author-
izations.4 4 Hence, the total of the obligational authority granted to the
Commission since the program started equals the total amount available
for expenditure.
As with all requests for appropriations, those of the Atomic Energy
Commission are considered first by the House of Representatives through
its Committee on Appropriations.5 These AEC estimates have been as
printed in the President’s budget document, except for five occasions when
they were reduced before the House had a chance to act on the initial
2 New obligational authority can be derived by subtracting the cash to liquidate prior year
contract authority from the total budget authorizations.
3 Cash appropriations can be derived by deducting contract authorizations from the total
budget authorizations.
4 The only case of rescission of contract authority was a cancellation of $635,623 made at
the AEC’s request in 1952 when the AEC converted entirely to a cash appropriation
basis.
5 The actual hearings and the preparation of the appropriation bill take place in a sub-
committee, which for the AEC up to the 84th Congress was that on Independent
Offices. In the period prior to 1944 all funds for atomic energy were hidden under
other appropriations, but as the magnitude of the operation increased the administra-
tion found it necessary to take Congressional leaders into confidence in order to
establish separate appropriations. Thus from 1944 to 1946, the period immediately
before the organization of the AEC, appropriations were piloted through Congress by
the leadership without any public discussion. See Henry L. Stimson and McGeorge
Bundy, On Active Service in Peace and War (New York: Harper & Bros., 1947),
p. 614.
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budget requests. In order to include these five cases of reductions, the
AEC estimates are referred to as revised estimates in the accompanying
tablets. 6
The average reduction from these revised estimates by the House of
Representatives was about 22 per cent. In this average is a 50 per cent
reduction in the supplemental appropriation bill for fiscal year 1953 for
the purpose of enforcing fuller construction planning rather than holding
back the program by that amount. When this outstanding but misleading
reduction is eliminated, the average reductions made by the House are
about 12 per cent below the revised estimates (see Table 1).
TABLE I
HOUSE ACTION ON AEC APPROPRIATIONS REQUESTS’i-
(in millions of dollclrs) 
To
*Includes both cash and contract authority.
fi AEC estimates reduced from $200 million prior to House action.
~ AEC estimates reduced from $1,025 million prior to House action.
§ AEC estimates reduced from $1,060 million prior to House action.
5 $635,623 of contract authority was rescinded this year at AEC’s request.
ft AEC estimates reduced from $1,593 million prior to House action.
n AEC estimates reduced from $1,366 million prior to House action.
6 The total effect of these revisions has been a reduction of $663 million, of which $497
million came in the Eisenhower administration’s first budget for fiscal year 1954.
Report to Accompany H. R. 5690, Independent Offices Appropriations Bill, 1954, 83d
Cong., 1st Sess., H. R. Rep. No. 550, pt. 1, p. 13, and pt. 2, p. 1 (June 11, 1953).
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TABLE II
SENATE ACTION ON AEC APPROPRIATIONS REQUESTS*
(in millions of dollars)
* Includes both cash and contract authority.
f AEC estimates increased from $1050 million prior to Senate action.
I AEC estimates increased from $51 million prior to Senate action.
The Senate Committee on Appropriations, considering agency budgets
after House action is completed, generally makes partial restoration of
House cuts. These increases can be represented as percentages above the
House allowances. For the AEC, by excluding again the misleading 1953
situation in which the Senate raised the House allowance by 146 per cent,
the average increase voted by the Senate (done only in eight out of seven,
teen appropriations bills) was somewhat over 4 per cent.7 7 More signifi,
cantly, Senate action produced an average reduction of only 3 per cent
from the AEC’s revised estimates (see Table II).
7 In two cases small increases in estimates totaling $43 million were made by the AEC
after the House action on the AEC budget but before the Senate Committee had
made its report. In these two cases these additional amounts were added to make
up the AEC’s revised requests. Report to Accompany H. R. 9920, Supplemental Ap-
propriations Bill, 1951, 81st Cong., 2d Sess., Sen. Rep., p. 2684 (December 20, 1950),
and Report to Accompany H. R. 3842, Fourth Supplemental Appropriations Bill, 1951,
82d Cong., 1st Sess., Sen. Rep. No. 329, p. 2 (May 22, 1951).
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When the differences between the House and Senate were compro-
mised (usually at an amount very near to an average between the two
amounts), the average by which the actual appropriations fell below the
AEC’s revised estimates was 9 per cent (see Table III). But this percentage
exaggerates the final net effect of appropriations control. Such distortion
comes about for two reasons.
First, Congress often makes a record of reduction by cuts which are
likely to be restored during the fiscal year. Thus on several occasions cuts
voted by the Appropriations Committees have been accompanied by state-
ments like the following:
In view of the assurance of AEC officials that funds already provided will meet all
requirements until early next spring the Committee has effected a reduction of $284,~
200,000 in the supplemental request of $484,200,000, leaving a total of $200,000,000, which
TABLE III
FINAL ACTION ON AEC APPROPRIATIONS REQUESTS *
(in millions of dollars)
* Includes both cash and contract authority.
this difference includes an additional $30 million AEC requested after House action.
* This difference includes an additional $13 million AEC requested after House action.
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will be entirely sufficient to meet any emergency needs for additional funds which may
arise prior to the time Congress has had a further opportunity to review the pro-
gram....
If just this $284,200,000 were deducted from AEC’s total requests, the esti.
mates received as appropriations would rise by 2 per cent (to 93 per cent).
Second, AEC estimates have been considerably less firm than those of
most other government agencies.9 This fact has prompted Congress to
make reductions in the hope of finding later that the AEC estimates were
too high and of making the AEC subsequently budget more carefully.10
The following quotation from a report of the House Committee thus ex-
plained reductions which it had voted:
... the Commission admitted during the hearings that estimates could vary as much as
25 to 331/3 %. Under these circumstances the committee believes that the reduction can be
made without hampering or slowing down this important program, and that additional
funds can be provided where more accurate estimates are available and the need therefor
demonstrated.&dquo;
In actuality, additional funds have been provided frequently during a
single fiscal year. For example, from 1948 to 1953 the AEC had an average
of two and one-half appropriations bills per fiscal year. Obviously chances
for restorations of reductions have been good.
It is impossible to evaluate with any precision the effect of these two
factors on the amount of reduction in AEC estimates made by Congress.
Nevertheless, there is no doubt that they have worked to soften the effect
of an already not-too-severe average reduction of 9 per cent in AEC’s esti-
mates. As has previously been pointed out, this percentage is well within
8 Report to Accompany H. R. 5650, Second Supplemental Appropriations Bill, 1952, 82d
Cong., 1st Sess., H. R. Rep. No. 1180, p. 13 (October 8, 1951). See also the sub-
committee chairman’s statement in the House, 93 Cong. Rec., 80th Cong., 1st Sess.,
p. 10043 (July 24, 1947).
9 This is an understandable condition for budgets for huge construction programs carried
on under conditions of such urgency and haste that budget estimates have been made
as much as two or three years before plans and specifications are completed and
sometimes even before sites have been selected. 
10 The impression should not be left that the AEC estimates have always been either too
high or too low. While the attention of Congress and the public has been drawn
to incidents in which costs greatly exceeded budget estimates, such as the Hanford
overrun, there have been numerous other occasions on which actual costs have been
well below budget estimates. On an over-all basis, estimates that were high and esti-
mates that were low offset one another, as evidenced by General Electric’s report on
57 major construction projects at Hanford, on all of which actual costs exceeded
budget estimates by less than one per cent (Investigation into the United States
Atomic Energy Project, Hearings before the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, 81st
Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 8, p. 356). Also the House Subcommittee went so far as to
complain, in connection with its review of the 1955 estimates, that the AEC had in
the past generally over-estimated its requirements for funds. The Subcommittee then
used this alleged fact as its justification for eliminating contingency funds from the
estimate. Report to Accompany H. R. 8583, Independent Offices Appropriations Bill,
1955, 83d Cong., 2d Sess., H. R. Rep. No. 1428, p. 10 (March 26, 1954).
11 Report to Accompany H. R. 9920, Second Supplemental Appropriations Bill, 1951, 81st
Cong., 2d Sess., H. R. Rep. No. 3193, p. 15 (Dec. 15, 1950).
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the margin of error in most of the AEC’s budget estimates. Hence it is
concluded that Congress has not exercised great influence over the scope
and tempo of the atomic energy program from the standpoint of actual
total dollars appropriated.
ADMINISTRATIVE AND PROCEDURAL RESTRICTIONS
Formal limitations providing control over an administrative agency can
be made by the Appropriations Committees in the form of various kinds
of restrictions added to the language of an appropriation act. Such provisos,
often added in bewildering profusion and complexity, all stem from the
general intent to circumscribe the agency’s freedom of action. Language
limitations attached to the AEC’s appropriations have been grouped into
four general areas: personnel, travel, construction, and community man-
agement.
Personnel
Congressional Appropriations Committees are particularly concerned
about the use of manpower in government, and they generally believe that
administrators are prone to want more and more personnel in highly paid
positions. They therefore employ various forms of personnel restrictions
added to the language of appropriations acts. These will now be taken up
in turn as they have been applied to the Atomic Energy Commission.
Salary Classifications. The original freedom granted to the AEC in its
organic act to set up its own salary classifications was limited by a proviso
which the House Appropriations Committee successfully added to the
fiscal year 1948 Appropriations Act in 1947. 12 For scientific and technical
personnel the Committee was willing to leave the freedom of the Com-
mission intact, but for managerial personnel, the Committee required the
Commission to follow the Classification Act of 1923 in setting classification
grades and salaries for its staff. In the Senate debate on this bill, three
members of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy attempted, but failed,
to define &dquo;scientific and technical personnel&dquo; to include practically all man-
agerial personnel of the AEC. In the following two fiscal years the AEC
continued without avail to request the deletion of this proviso bringing
its managerial personnel within the salary scale of the federal civil service.
The stringency of this limitation on maximum salaries was partially
relieved shortly after the new Classification Act was passed in 1949. This
Act provided for three new grades above the preceding maximum for all
12 Pub. L. No. 269, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 61 Stat. at L. 589, subsequently rephrased to
incorporate the terminology of the "Classification Act of 1949" (Pub. L. No. 429, 81st
Cong., 1st Sess., 63 Stat. at L. 959) in the "Independent Offices Appropriations Act of
1952," Pub. L. No. 137, 82d Cong., 1st Sess., 65 Stat. at L. 269. All appropriation
acts from 1947 to 1955 inclusive have included this proviso.
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agencies covered by civil service regulations. The AEC was quick to secure
from the General Accounting Office an informal interpretation that the
1949 Classification Act could be extended to the AEC, which allowed the
AEC to pay its managerial personnel at the higher salaries. Under this
Act each federal agency was assigned a specific quota of these &dquo;super-
grades&dquo; (as they were called), but the AEC was not so limited. 13
Personnel Employees’ Ratio. Another device employed by the Appro-
priations Committees has been that of fixing a ratio of the number of
persons engaged in personnel work to the total employment in a federal
agency. The Independent Offices Subcommittees have inserted this require-
ment into their annual appropriations bills since fiscal year 1950.~¢
Specific requests for exemption of the AEC from this limitation in con-
nection with the bills for fiscal years 1950 and 1953 were not granted.
However, the AEC has had a distinct advantage over other agencies in
operating under this proviso. The AEC, having its personnel work merged
with &dquo;organization and methods&dquo; work in one division, has been able to
assign additional employees to personnel duties on less than half-time and
thus not count them as personnel workers. In effect, the AEC has not
been burdened by this conventional ratio.
Limitations on Personal Services. One method of requiring reductions
in personnel took the form of a general formula known as the Jensen
amendment. First proposed in 1951; it was actually included in most
appropriations acts in fiscal years 1952 and 1953.15 It prohibited agencies
from filling three out of four vacancies which occurred in their organiza-
tion until a reduced level of employment (usually 90 per cent) had been
reached. The Commission was subject to the Jensen amendment for two
or three months, between the passage of its regular 1952 appropriation
and the 1952 supplemental appropriation, in which it was exempted.
While the AEC may have been slightly inconvenienced during this period,
it escaped the major impact which this amendment had on nearly all
other agencies of the government.
In recent years the Appropriations Committees have seen fit to apply
to administrative agencies an appropriation limitation on the total dollars
spent for personal services. Such limitations, not applied to the AEC until
fiscal year 1952, have been included in each of the AEC’s appropriations
since that year. In all cases the amount established as a limitation was
well below the amount included by the Commission for personal services
in its budget estimate.
13 Independent Offices Appropriations for 1953, Hearings before the subcommittee of the
House Committee on Appropriations, 82d Cong., 2d Sess., p. 1123. Also see 63 Stat.
at L. 959.
14 Pub. L. No. 266, 81st Cong., 1st Sess., 63 Stat. at L. 634.
15 Pub. L. No. 137, 82d Cong., 1st Sess., 65 Stat. at L. 292, sec. 605 (i).
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But the AEC has had available a significant loophole. Its system of
operating through private contractors has permitted considerable flexibility
in assigning functions to contractor personnel instead of government em-
ployees. For example, while the guards at Los Alamos laboratory are civil
servants, those at most other AEC installations are employed by the con-
tractors who operate them. Similarly, chauffeurs, telephone operators,
maintenance and repair crews, and so forth, may be government employees
at one installation and contractor employees at another. Unquestionably
the opportunity for shifting functions from government to contractor per-
sonnel exists, 16 but it is impossible to determine the degree to which this
device has been employed by the AEC to evade limitations on its per-
sonnel imposed by Congress.
All in all, the AEC has not been subjected to as much appropriations
control in regard to its employment of personnel as have most other
civilian executive agencies.
Travel
An appropriation limitation on the total amount the AEC could obli-
gate for travel appeared first in fiscal year 1949.17 Then it reappeared in
the appropriations acts for the fiscal years 1954 and 1955. Many agencies
have had this kind of restriction practically every year, and thus the AEC
has been restricted in this way much less frequently than other agencies.
Furthermore, the opportunity to shift some travel activities from the Com-
mission to the contractors has been available here also.
Construction
In the area of construction procedures the Appropriations Committees
have made their greatest effort in an attempt to require what they regard
as economical methods. The AEC, believing that much time can be saved,
has simultaneously carried on design, procurement, and construction activi-
ties for new plants and facilities. This is not in accordance with the usual
commercial procedure, in which design precedes procurement and procure-
ment precedes construction. For their part, the Appropriations Committees,
and the House Committee in particular, have stressed the generally un-
economical nature of this unusual AEC procedure and the corresponding
roughness of its budget estimates, often prepared before any detailed design
work has been started or a site selected. Accordingly, the Committees
successfully inserted in the 1950 appropriations a provision which would
prevent the Commission from (1) starting any new construction project
for which an estimate was not included in the budget, and (2) starting
16 Independent Offices Appropriations Bill, 1950, Hearings before the subcommittee of the
Committee on Appropriations, 81st Cong., 1st Sess., pp. 1106-1109.
" Pub. L. No. 862, 80th Cong., 2d Sess., 62 Stat. at L. 1197.
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any new construction project, the currently estimated cost of which ex-
ceeded the estimated cost included in the budget, unless the Director of
the Bureau of the Budget specifically approved of the construction and a
detailed explanation was submitted by that Director to the Appropriations
Committees and the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy. 18 This Act also
provided that whenever the current estimate of the cost of a construction
project exceeded by 15 per cent the estimate included in the budget for
that project, the Commission was required to submit a detailed explanation
to the Bureau and the three committees named before.
Three months later, probably as a result of the knowledge that the
Soviet Union had an A-bomb, most of the stringency was taken out of
these provisions by an amendment, sponsored by the Joint Committee on
Atomic Energy, allowing the Commission to ignore the above provisions
in undertaking the construction of &dquo;technical and construction facilities&dquo;
if it certified to the Director of the Bureau of the Budget that immediate
construction was necessary to the &dquo;national defense and security,&dquo; and if
the Director agreed.19 The principal effect of this change was to free the
Commission from detailed justification of new construction required prev-
iously by the superseded provisos.
For 1953, the House Committee revised the construction rider to pro-
vide that the AEC might not start any construction project for which an
estimate was not included in the budget or whose currently estimated cost
exceeded by 35 per cent the amount included in the budget estimate. 20
Despite the Commission’s plea that the Budget Bureau escape clause be
restored and that architect-engineer work be exempted along with projects
amounting to less than $250,000, the proviso was passed as originally
conceived.
In the 1953 Supplemental Appropriations Bill, the House Committee
made its supreme effort to require the Commission’s compliance with its
notion of businesslike procedures. The Committee cut by 53 per cent the
funds requested by the Commission to finance the fiscal 1953 expansion
program, and at the same time added to the restrictions one which pro-
vided that no part of the appropriation could be used for the construction
of any project unless funds were available for the completion of such
project.21 The intent here was to force the Commission to complete the
18 The limitations contained in this proviso were not to apply to any construction project
where the total estimated cost did not exceed $500,000. See Pub. L. No. 266, 81st
Cong., 1st Sess., 63 Stat. at L. 634.
19 This bill, Sen. 2668 of the 81st Cong., became Public Law No. 422, approved October 28,
1949; 63 Stat. at L. 947.
20 Pub. L. No. 445, 82d Cong., 2d Sess., 66 Stat. at L. 395.
21 Report to Accompany H. R. 8370, Supplemental Appropriations Bill, 1953, 82d Cong.,
2d Sess., H. R. Rep. No. 2316, p. 23 (June 26, 1952).
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design of a project (in order to ascertain its total cost) before beginning
construction and to permit the Committee to look at these estimates before
appropriating the balance of the funds required.
Although the latter objective was thwarted by the compromise finally
worked out, which accepted the Senate’s desire to appropriate the full
amount requested for the expansion program, the former objective of forc-
ing firmer estimates on all construction projects was accomplished. A
special procedure for making these estimates and reporting them for con-
solidation in the office of the AEC’s Director of Finance was instituted by
the Commission to operate in keeping with the requirements of this
proviso.22 The cumulative effect, then, of these construction provisos has
been to induce more complete planning prior to construction in the Com-
mission’s expansion programs.23
Community Management
The House Appropriations Committee reports for fiscal years 1949 and
1950 recommended sizable reductions in Commission expenditures for
town operations management fees.24 Evidently dissatisfied with the Com-
mission’s response to these recommendations, the Committee included in
the fiscal year 1951 bill a dollar limitation on the fees which the Commis-
sion could pay to its community management contractors. Despite pre-
dictions by both Commissioners and Joint Committee members that dire
results would follow, the House Committee succeeded in forcing through
this proviso, which in effect cut in half the fees paid community manage-
ment contractors at Oak Ridge. Afterward, the Commission was able to
shift the contract to certain staff members of the previous contractor who
formed a new company to take over the community management function
with a lower fee. Notably, the program did not collapse as the Commis-
sion spokesmen feared it would. This effort on the part of the House
Committee to introduce a greater degree of economy into the AEC com-
munity operations can definitely be called a success. While actual dollar
22 U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, "General Manager’s Bulletin," GM-BUD-3, Serial No.
149, and AEC Manual, Vol. 1000, pt. 300, chaps. 1304 and 1305.
23 A minor rider relating to construction appeared in the fiscal year 1952 appropriations
bill and provided that funds contained in the AEC appropriation should not be used
for any new construction project until after the Commission had "notified all archi-
tects and engineers involved that the plans for such projects should be purely utili-
tarian and without unnecessary refinements." Pub. L. No. 137, 82d Cong., 1st Sess.,
65 Stat. at L. 269. Despite a letter from Chairman Dean, which Senator Maybank
read into the Congressional Record [82d Cong., 1st Sess., Vol. 97, p. 6713 (June 19,
1951)], predicting dire results if this provision remained in the bill, it appears that
the Commission was able to satisfy the requirements without undue inconvenience.
24 See Report to Accompany H. R. 6829, Supplemental Independent Offices Appropriations
Bill, 1949, 80th Cong., 2d Sess., H. R. Rep. No. 2245, p. 3 (June 8, 1948), and Report
to Accompany H. R. 4177, Independent Offices Appropriations Bill, 1950, 81st Cong.,
1st Sess., H. R. Rep. No. 425, p. 3 (April 11, 1949).
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savings were small, especially in view of the fact that the contractor whose
fee had been cut sued the government successfully for breach of contract,
it was a clear triumph in principle for the House Committee over the ve-
hement opposition from the Commission and the Joint Committee on
Atomic Energy.
THE DEGREE OF CONTROL
The Appropriations Committees have made hardly any impact on the
scope and scale of the atomic energy program. They have made more of
an impact in controlling administrative operations by specific limitations
and procedural requirements written into appropriation acts. Thus the
over-all impact can be summed up as follows: to a very great extent in
the area of program development and to a lesser extent in the area of
administration the AEC appears to have been freed from appropriations
control.
Other studies of the impact of appropriations control on particular
programs and administrative agencies have not come to light. Hence, the
results obtained here for the AEC can not now be compared with those
obtained from studies of other executive agencies. A nonsystematic search
of the history of other appropriations statutes reveals a generally greater
use of reductions in budget estimates and of language limitations by the
Appropriations Committees. Accordingly, if one were to draw a continuum
reaching from the agencies least subject to appropriations control to the
agencies most subject to appropriations control, the AEC should be placed
among those agencies least controlled.
A HYPOTHESIS OF CAUSES
What are the characteristics of the atomic energy operation which
appear likely to account for this low degree of appropriations control? The
AEC was always conditioned by the need for speed in its program. Thus
the natural tendency of administrators to stress program adequacy (the
accomplishment of results regardless of costs) was greatly fortified, and the
AEC consciousness of urgency made them extremely sensitive to the small-
est appropriations restriction and extremely resistant to the suasion of the
committees in behalf of economy and efficiency.
Organizationally, the AEC was able to resist appropriations control by
its use of the contractor system. By this device the AEC arranged with
business firms to perform its manufacturing, research, and developmental
duties. The general doctrine of the Commission was opposed to the em,
ployment of a large number of government supervisors of the AEC’s vast
contractual operation. Therefore, inefficiency, if it was a problem in the
AEC, mostly concerned contractor operations rather than merely the direct
operations of the AEC itself. And in contractor operations the Appropria-
725
tions Committees were not readily able to attack inefficiency. They could
not impose limitations of appropriation acts directly on the contractors’
budget authorizations. Moreover, they were prone to follow the American
theory that private business is ipso facto efficient and to assume that this
efficiency would carry over into the contractual operation performed for
the government. Unavoidably then, the contractor system frustrated the
Appropriations Committees, because the government officials were neither
directly in charge of administrative operations nor sufficiently numerous
to keep careful check on the business contractors.
The low degree of appropriations control over the AEC has one over-
riding cause inhering in the nature of the AEC’s program. A mission vital
to national defense and security endows an executive agency with consider-
able protection from legislative encroachment. The AEC’s mission is para-
mount to national defense, sensitive to the barometer of international ten-
sions, and infused with a sense of urgency exceeding that of any other
single operation of the national government.
Although the importance of the AEC program for national defense
acts as a general curb on appropriations control, it must be emphasized
that there are certain qualifications of this broad generalization. First, there
is the matter of time. As familiarization with the agency’s program is
gained, Appropriations Committees become more adept at exercising con-
trol without endangering the whole program. For example, contrary to its
early hesitant approach, the House Appropriations Committee in July,
1952, boldly insisted on a procedure by which the AEC had to present
concrete plans and procedures before starting any new construction ac-
tivity. Second, there is the matter of the directness of the relationship of
different aspects of the program to national defense. For example, restric-
tions over the research features of the program have been more stringent
than those over raw materials procurement; similarly, as the AEC expands
its peaceful atomic power activities they will be susceptible to greater con-
trol than has been the atomic weapons program.
To repeat, then, the fear of the Appropriations Committees to take the
responsibility for injuring so vital a defense program is the major reason
why these Committees do not exercise strong appropriations control over
the AEC. It is likely that appropriations control is weak also over other
federal defense programs, but a great amount of research will be necessary
to prove it.
